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Note especially
pp. 31-37 re
a) Primary Health Care
b) Sanitation.

EXTERNAL EVALUATION REPORT
ON
THE AUSTRIAN HUMANITARIAN AID TO AFGHANS
(AUSTRIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE, ARC)

Presented to
THE DEPARTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
FEDERAL CHANCELLERY (BKA)
REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA
(Ref.: EH-Projekt 1458-01/93)



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INTRODUCTION

i) Terms of reference

1. The Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI, Geneva) was asked by the Austrian Federal Chancellery (BKA) to evaluate during January 1994, the Austrian humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan which, in effect, meant evaluating the programme and performance of the well-known non-governmental entity, Austrian Relief Committee (ARC), over a period of some 13 years.

2. The Austrian Government has supported the ARC since the inception of the agency in 1980. The Government's financial input varied from 33 to 50 per cent of the total budget of ARC, the rest being covered by a variety of non-Austrian donors. Around 1991, the Government realized that other donors were shifting their emphasis (and consequently their commitment to the ARC programme) to activities inside Afghanistan. The Austrian government aid to ARC had always focused on relief aspects and activities inside Pakistan. Pakistan was, and still is, among the specifically selected programme countries for the Austrian Government's development assistance, while Afghanistan is not. The Terms of Reference (TOR) of the evaluation mission were agreed by the two sides, a distinguishing feature of these being the wish of BKA that the evaluation team should not only evaluate the ARC projects and identify the lessons learnt but also make recommendations for orderly phasing out of the Programme.

ii) Need for evaluation

3. It should be noted that throughout the thirteen years of its existence, ARC was never subjected to external evaluation. There were sporadic missions from Vienna which carried out internal analyses and evaluations of various projects but the ARC Programme as a whole did not benefit from the views and perceptions of outsiders. When the Government of Austria felt that it might be left with the prospect of being the sole funder of ARC activities in Pakistan, it decided that such a situation called for an external evaluation. At the same time, disturbing news on

ARC activities had made their way to the Federal Chancellery which highlighted the fact that ARC projects called for an evaluation by outsiders, all the more so since the agency had received and administered approximately 150 million Austrian shillings over the years.

iii) Objectives of evaluation

4. According to the TOR, it was agreed that the Evaluation Team would concentrate on the following objectives:

- i) to evaluate programme performance as regards preparation and implementation of its plans, follow up previous assessments especially by ARC's board and achievement of targets and objectives;
- ii) to assess the programme and its results according to the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability;
- iii) to formulate lessons learnt concerning relief aid for refugees and its transition to development aid for repatriation and reintegration;
- iv) to make recommendations on how the programme should prepare for an orderly phasing out.

5. In keeping with these objectives, the findings of the Evaluation Team and its recommendations are based on:

- i) A wide range of documents and reports belonging to ARC and to other non-governmental and inter-governmental bodies made available to the Team both in Vienna and Peshawar.
- ii) Detailed discussions with the present and former staff members of ARC, now working, or having worked both in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- iii) Interviews in Peshawar and Islamabad with the UN officials, belonging to the agencies having collaborated with ARC, especially, UNDP, UNHCR, UNOCHA.
- iv) Meetings with the host government officials.
- v) Staff members of other NGOs working in Peshawar.
- vi) Interviews with a wide range of beneficiaries of ARC in all the camps, both male and female in different age and professional groups.

6. During its field mission, the Evaluation Team followed, by and large, the methods indicated to the Federal Chancellery in the methodology paper submitted before the Team's departure from Vienna. A work plan was developed upon arrival in Pakistan and shared with senior ARC staff in Peshawar. Eventually, it served as the basis for the table of contents of the final report. Upon return from Pakistan, a Preliminary Report was presented to, and discussed with BKA, ARC as well as the Association for Development and Cooperation (ADC). The present Report is the culmination of the evaluation process undertaken by IBHI.

iv) Structure of the report

7. In order to facilitate discussions in Vienna, the Preliminary Report responded strictly to the TOR requirements in the order established by BKA. The present Report, based on a more holistic approach, has its own structure as follows: Historical aspects are introduced first to explain the setting and evolution of ARC as a relief/development-oriented non-governmental entity. Then the conceptual aspects are outlined followed by the more practical aspects: structural, administrative and financial. These sections lead to the core of the Report, i.e. ARC operations over the years. Evaluation findings and comments follow each programme component. The Report ends with recommendations concerning the phasing out process as well as a number of conclusions/lessons learnt.

8. In order to keep the Report as brief as possible, a series of Annexes, summarizing the main aspects, supported by facts and figures, were developed. The Director of ARC and his colleagues were most helpful in the preparation of these annexes, attached as a separate section to this Report.

For this as well as for an excellent cooperation extended by them to facilitate our task and field trips, we are thankful. We are also grateful to the officials of BKA, ADC and ARC for their insights and for the efforts they made to help us gain an overview in a very short period of time.

I. HISTORICAL ASPECT

i) Historical background

"That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important of all lessons that history has to teach".

Aldous Huxley, 1959

9. The Afghan history is replete with upheavals, socio-political unrest and tribal warfare. But one of its dominant characteristics has been the fierce opposition of the Afghan people to foreign domination. Afghanistan is a fascinating mosaic of ethnies, tribes and clans which fight with each other until a foreign power appears on the scene at which time they try to unite to struggle together against it. This is what happened when on the eve of Christmas 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. Historically, once the external threat disappears, the internal bickering begins again. This is what is happening now.

10. The Soviet invasion had been preceded by serious political unrest within Afghanistan. Prince Daoud who had been instrumental in deposing his cousin, King Zahir Shah, and turning the monarchy into a "democracy" (becoming himself the all-powerful President) was killed in the April (Saur) Revolution in 1978. Nur Mohammad Taraki of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) who succeeded Daoud as President, was himself killed in September 1979. His Deputy Hafizallah Amin who succeeded him was killed in his turn, reportedly by the Russians who installed Babrak Karmal in his place. Karmal had been a refugee in the USSR and was a protégé of Moscow. Meanwhile, PDPA had split into two hostile factions, Parcham and Khalq and further sub-groups. When Karmal starting losing grip, he was brought back to Russia and replaced by President Najibullah who is reportedly still a "refugee" in the UN compound in Kabul. It is interesting to note that during the turbulent period since President Daoud, the most important

foreign aid donors were USSR, USA, (West) Germany and China, in that order.

11. The struggle between ethnies (mainly Tajiks) of the North and Pushtuns of the South is also not new. Already in the first decades of the century, this struggle had been a dominant feature of Afghanistan. King Amanullah, was ousted by a Tajik leader who called himself King Habibullah II, more popularly known as Bacha Saqa (son of a water-carrier). The struggle between the present President Rabbani (Tajik) and the Prime Minister Hekmetyar (Pashtun) is considered by many to be a sinister repetition of history.

12. In the Afghan society at large, the issue of "modernization" has been consistently contentious ever since Amir Habibullah I took the first timid steps in that direction at the beginning of the century. Pursuing that policy more vigorously, his son King Amanullah lost his throne as a result. President Daoud and his several successors had similar problems with "modernization". The traditionalists, who still constitute the vast majority of Afghanistan, have tenaciously held on to their "anti-modernization" struggle. It should be noted that while urban areas of Afghanistan have been open to "modernization" efforts, the rural areas where the overwhelming majority of Afghans live and which were the backbone of Mujahideen's struggle, have been traditionally resistant.

13. Besides the tribal warfare and the resistance of the rural Afghans to "modernistic" urban Afghans, another factor of importance in the Afghan history is religion. Afghans are by and large conservative in their religious beliefs which sometimes hamper progress but at other times serve as the sustaining force behind the struggle against non-Muslims. Hence the power of Jihad (Holy War) against Communism. But within the fold of Islam, Afghanistan has suffered from the struggle between the Sunni and Shi'a sects. ARC was perceived from the outset as leaning towards Shi'as in terms of choice of staff and locations for assistance inside Afghanistan. Hence ARC's difficulties with the Sunni leadership which dominated the Peshawar scene. Many observers attributed these difficulties, rightly or wrongly to the fact that the first Director of ARC was a Shi'a and perceived by many to be a "leftist".

14. ARC Peshawar leadership was also perceived, rightly, as forward-looking, progressive and tuned to modernization. Hence the traditional Afghan resistance. One of the major issues espoused by ARC at the outset was uplifting the status of women: "The gender issue". It met with fierce resistance from the traditionalists and, consequently, was gradually abandoned by ARC.

15. The above paragraphs are intended to show that sensitivity to the history and culture of a country has an important role to play in the success of any undertaking. ARC initiated its own endeavours on behalf of Afghan refugees against a specific historical background. Due to the factors mentioned above, the ARC leadership had serious difficulties for socio-political reasons, and some of the initial ambitions of ARC remained unfulfilled, obliging it to adopt a more flexible and pragmatic posture.

ii) Origin and role of ARC

16. The Austrian Relief Committee for Afghan Refugees (ARC) came into being in 1980, thanks to the efforts of a handful of Afghans living in Austria and a few Austrians, sympathetic to the Afghan cause. Its genesis was quite similar to that of a number of non-governmental groups that mushroomed in various Western countries as a reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the unfolding drama of the massive exodus of Afghans, mainly from the provinces bordering Iran and Pakistan. The ARC founders collected funds from the general public and got financial support from the Austrian Government. One of the founders, an Afghan of Shi'a origin, was sent to Pakistan by the Austrian foreign aid agency IIZ which employed him, as the first Director of ARC. He stayed there in that position for almost a decade. Another founder, a committed and enthusiastic Austrian became the Chairman of the Board of ARC and remained in that position until his demise more than a decade later. The two men, with the help of other founders (notably the present Chairman and members of the Board) and an increasing number of supporters within and outside Austria, were to mark profoundly the evolution of ARC.

17. The role of ARC as conceived at its inception was to provide relief assistance to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It evolved in different directions soon after the first relief efforts. The initial focus was primary health care, coupled with sanitation. To these were added a series of vocational training programmes and rural development activities within Afghanistan. An analysis and evaluation of the various constituent elements of ARC is contained in Chapter VI of this Report. With the liberation of large areas of Afghanistan, the so-called cross-border operations were initiated by ARC as was being done by a large number of Peshawar-based NGOs. As will be seen later, these had only partial success. These initiatives did cause some confusion in the (undefined) conceptual framework of ARC.

18. An interesting demonstration of the confusion is some of the official stationery of ARC that the Evaluation Team came across in Peshawar where ARC is printed on top in three languages: English, German and Pashtu. The German title reads: "Österreichisches Hilfskomitee für Afghanistan" while the English title reads "Austrian Relief Committee for Afghan Refugees". The Pashtu translation has still different connotation. The stationery used nowadays bears the title "Austrian Relief Committee for Afghans" (probably to include cross-border operations alongwith the Afghan refugees). Each title indicates different scope of ARC activities. But then, as Shakespeare put it: "What is in a name? / That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet".

iii) Components of ARC

19. ARC's growth from relief and some mobile health units to a series of full-fledged projects was based on ad hoc responses to perceived needs of targeted populations. The activities were wide-ranging and are summarized, irrespective of their life-span, in the following paragraphs. ARC's management was carried out (a) from Vienna through the Vienna Board as a supervisory body with no support staff except volunteer members and a Secretary (general) of the Board and (b) from Peshawar through the main office headed by a Director and a fairly large staff. Details are contained in Sections III and IV of the Report. The components of ARC, supervised/directed/coordinated from Vienna/Peshawar, according to sectors

of activity, are:

20. Primary Health: PHC's main office in Mardan runs three BHUs in (i) Gandaf, (ii) Baghicha and (iii) Kagan. Each BHU has a registrar's office and its activities include: Mother and Child health care, outpatients department; pharmacy, vaccination malaria, dental and nursing sections. Gandaf and Baghicha also have physiotherapy services. PHC also includes various training programmes. In addition, ARC's PHC project includes activities inside Afghanistan through BHU's operating in Khushi (Logar province), Behsud (Jalalabad) and Malistan (Ghazni).
21. Maternal and child health activities include antenatal care, supervision of deliveries, postnatal care and child spacing advice. Preventive activities of PHC include malaria control, TB control, immunization EPI, sanitation and environmental health education while rehabilitative activities include a nutrition programme and physiotherapy. Additionally, there is a children's park in Gandaf which helps in literacy and handicraft training as well as a Training Center in Mardan with hostel facilities.
22. Sanitation and Basic Health (SBH) project which was initiated in 1982 had the following main activities: latrine construction and maintenance, environmental health and sanitation training. This component of ARC Programme has been successfully turned into a Pakistani NGO.
23. Technical Training Centers were established by ARC to provide Afghans with vocational training in carpentry, masonry, tinsmithery, welding and blacksmithery as well as electrical and Radio repair. The first center was established in Jehangirabad in Peshawar in 1983 and was later taken over by the Norwegian Refugee Council. A second and larger one was established in Akora Khatak in 1986 and a third in 1987 in Munda. Recently, the dwindling training activities were transferred to a small location on Canal Road in Peshawar.
24. Rural Development Programme represents ARC's principal efforts inside Afghanistan on the basis of an "integrated" approach to rural and community development. After initial attempts in the province of Qandahar, the main activities

were concentrated in the provinces of Ghazni and Logar. A wide range of activities besides the BHUs mentioned above, marred by considerable management difficulties, include: wheat seed trials and multiplication; tree nurseries, vegetable and plant production, veterinary services and animal husbandry as well as diverse income-generating activities including bee-keeping and agriculture extension services and training.

iv) Evolution of ARC

25. As is evident from the preceding paragraphs, ARC spread itself too thin on the ground in terms of its operational activities, without adequate and firm financial backing, with insufficient experienced human resources and without a holistic vision. It evolved on the basis of pragmatism, bordering on operational opportunism. Its diverse and wide-ranging activities had no inherent logic but its flexibility stood it in good stead for institutional growth on the basis of donor support. Beginning modestly with some relief work and a few mobile health units, ARC established itself solidly, at least in the field of primary health care. In mid eighties, as big chunks of Afghan territory began to be liberated by the Mujahideen, ARC could not resist the temptation of moving into Afghanistan. The policy was right but the preparation was inadequate and the choice of operation areas not altogether judicious. The expansion of ARC was somewhat haphazard. Likewise, its winding-up can be problematic unless carefully planned.

II. CONCEPTUAL ASPECT

"Men are strong only as long as they represent a strong idea".

Sigmund Freud, 1930

i) Conceptual framework

26. ARC came into existence more as a spontaneous response to the Soviet invasion and ensuing conflict leading to a large refugee movement than as a result of deliberate pre-defined policy. As stated earlier, some Afghans living in Austria, supported by a few deeply concerned Austrians were behind the genesis of a fragile entity which, through their tenacious efforts, grew into a widely known and effective NGO. While the zeal of the Afghans wanting to help their compatriots in need was understandable, the commitment the Austrian co-founders, imbued with a humanitarian spirit, brought to the common effort should be especially commended.

27. ARC began with no "conceptual framework" and no clearly defined "objectives". In general terms, the founders simply wanted to help the Afghan refugees, chose to focus on primary health care without any prior experience, either of the situation in the field or the chosen sector of activity. Gradually, ARC took on different types of projects, according to perceived needs and in an ad-hoc manner. The projects snow-balled into a Programme whose constituent elements had little inherent logic but which, nonetheless, attracted the attention of a variety of donors. The latter supported ARC because it was one of the first to establish itself and could serve as a useful channel for what the donors, with no local offices of their own wished to contribute towards refugee relief.

28. The founders of ARC had access to knowledge of Afghanistan, its people and its history. However, when plunging into the chaos of the early eighties caused by a fast-growing number of refugees and the absence of well-defined aid structures

within Pakistan, ARC had considerable difficulties. But it was not alone: other expatriate NGOs had to face similar problems. From its preferred field of Primary Health Care (PHC), ARC moved into other aid sectors in several locations in and around Peshawar. However, PHC has remained since the beginning the backbone of ARC activities.

29. The Team was struck by the fact that since its birth in 1980, there had been no external evaluation of ARC besides the recent NOVIB mission which was geared more to future "strategic planning" than to objective evaluation. (The thrust of NOVIB report was activities inside Afghanistan.) Consequently, the inherent weaknesses regarding objectives and results of the multiple activities of ARC remained relatively undetected. Several internal evaluation reports prepared by ARC staff or Board members served useful purpose but amounted, nonetheless, to being "judge and party in the same case". Their purpose was usually to facilitate planning for the next year than to develop a holistic vision of the overall activity. Moreover, there was frequent confusion between "tactics" and "strategy" and between "projects" and "Programme".

30. The ARC activities, like those of many other NGOs in Pakistan, were influenced negatively by three erroneous assumptions:

- i) That "integration" and repatriation are potentially conflicting targets.
- ii) That the withdrawal of Soviet troops would mean peace.
- iii) That peace would lead to the return of refugees "en masse".

31. It is important to note that 62 per cent of Afghan refugees in Pakistan are from within an area of about 200 kilometers along the Pakistan border, most of them from the three frontier provinces of Kunar, Nangrahar and Paktia. Their coming and going depends more on the local conditions, personal existential considerations and the collective wishes of their tribes and their leaders than on the relatively abstract concept of peace at national level. Similarly, the notions of freedom, liberty, dignity etc., often emphasized by foreigners, have to be viewed in the specific Afghan cultural, political and historical context.

32. Experience in the camps, where ARC has been active, has proven that the

questions regarding the level of local integration or personal qualifications are not as relevant to repatriation as they might appear. For example, the entire population of one camp, Munda, where ARC was active, has repatriated because it was a camp dominated by the HEZB party of Hekmetyar. The refugees were simply told to go back and they did. In the other ARC-assisted camps, repatriation of this kind is less likely in the foreseeable future.

33. In the three camps visited by the team, Baghicha, Gandaf and Kagan, over 50% of the present population is less than 15 years old. In other words, the majority is born and brought up in Pakistan. For these young people, repatriation to a country they do not know at all has a different meaning than it has for the theoreticians of the refugee world.

34. In these circumstances, phasing out of a programme is not necessarily related to actual or perceived needs of people but rather to the fact that the foreign donor is beginning to suffer from "donor fatigue". Other donors may replace it but even if no one volunteered, life will go on. Perhaps with less primary education or less health care but more comparable to local (and regional) standards of living and quality of life.

ii) Role of individuals

35. From its inception, ARC was dominated and its policies and choices strongly influenced by individuals to such an extent that one can almost talk of a "cult of personality". Through the eighties, two strong personalities, one in Peshawar and the other in Vienna, overwhelmed the scene. They did not designate or prepare deputies able to replace them without the whole programme feeling the tremors of change.

36. ARC's top management remained unchanged for too long. Then, from 1989, exactly the contrary happened. There was rapid turn-over of leadership in Peshawar after the departure of its first Director. At the Vienna end, the untimely death of ARC's first Chairman was a trauma from which ARC has had difficulty to recover. While plausible explanations linked to circumstances and internal Austrian

mechanisms exist, the overall situation was unhealthy in both cases, from the point of view of management.

iii) Role of Austrian Government

37. The relationship between ARC Vienna/ARC Peshawar (and their links to BKA and ADC) was never clearly defined. At the government policy-making level, ARC was treated as a "country-cousin", object of "benign neglect". It seems that the Government never got around to preparing a coherent NGO policy which could set the framework for non-governmental entities like ARC despite the fact that NGOs to date administer a very substantial part of the national budget funds earmarked for development co-operation.

38. Beyond the interest shown sporadically by the Austrian Embassy in Islamabad, there was no systematic government monitoring of ARC activities during the years 1980-1993, and nobody seemed to question the ARC expenditure of government funds until 1991 when other ARC donors began to decrease the overall funding. The fact that strong personalities with considerable public appeal and power of persuasion were heading the agency seemed to have served as sufficient guarantee for funding which continued year after year. Thus, the "cult of personality" may have worked as a safeguard mechanism against possible interference, even by donors themselves.

39. When the government did take note of the fact that monitoring/evaluation might be needed, it took more than two years to take concrete action. The present external evaluation which could and should have been undertaken in 1991, when the government became aware that a changed situation was emerging, was not embarked on until early 1994. In retrospect, it is clear that it is best to have external evaluation at regular intervals, particularly at the beginning of a Programme or whenever substantial funds have been expended, so that the policy-makers remain currently aware of the progress towards the goals determined by them and, thus, be in a position to intervene, if necessary, in a timely manner.

iv) Innovative aspects: Afghanization and gender issues

40. The lack of a conceptual framework and a corresponding goal-oriented time-table led to ARC's "pragmatism". This may appear, theoretically, to be serious lacuna. But it also gave ARC considerable flexibility and the capacity to adjust to evolving circumstances. It also allowed an activity to sprout and wither away (see gender issue below) without ARC getting institutionally weakened.

41. ARC promoted with pride the motto of "helping refugees to help themselves". It tried to "Afghanize" its activities and encouraged income-generating projects. The results, however, remained below expectations. ARC was bolder in launching innovative thinking than in translating it into reality. This was partly due to the sui generis nature of the Afghan situation and partly due to internal institutional and structural weaknesses of ARC.

42. From the outset, the "Afghanization" concept was misconstrued. When the UN introduced and encouraged the idea, the purpose was to increase the Afghan self-management capacity, to decrease the dependency syndrome and to encourage Afghans to share, if not assume, responsibility for what is done by the international community for them. It was not to carpet-roll refugee programmes into Afghanistan in a great hurry (which is what ARC did from 1985 on). The first attempt by ARC to do so in Qandahar backfired. The subsequent attempts in Logar and Ghazni have not hitherto yielded results which the Vienna Board could consider satisfactory.

43. ARC distinguished itself right from the beginning from most other foreign NGOs by placing Afghans at the top local management level. The expatriate element was very limited, or more accurately it consisted for the most part, of expatriates of Afghan origin, recruited abroad. This, in the long run, was both good and bad. Afghans, left to themselves can tend to compete with each other and have factional or tribal problems. This is not to say that they are not capable of self-management but rather that unless and until a strong, homogenous Afghan team is built, there is need for supervision and guidance from elsewhere.

44. Nonetheless, the efforts of ARC from the outset to keep Afghans in the forefront (albeit imported Afghans) should be considered commendable. In a way,

ARC was among the forerunners of the overall UN/NGO goal of Afghanisation. In discussions with local UNDP/OPs office, the Team noted the great progress made by Afghan partners as recipients of UN funds. Starting modestly in 1989, the Afghan implementing agencies had overtaken as the international partners of UNDP by 1992 (see the Chart attached to this Report as Annex I.). Were it not for some mishaps in its projects inside Afghanistan, the ARC record of "Afghanisation" could have been a feather in its cap. Some details regarding ARC programme inside Afghanistan are included in Section VI of this Report.

45. With regard to the "gender issue", credit goes to ARC for having been among the first agencies to promote it. It was brave to defend women's rights and to promote their well-being through income-generating activities and through literacy and hygiene campaigns. ARC was quick to learn from the early research reports issued on the Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan that women's conditions had to be considerably improved if self-sufficiency of the refugee communities, or betterment in their living conditions, were to be achieved.

46. Already by the mid 1980s ARC had extensive women's programmes in the camps where it was active. They were later taken over, and further developed, by other agencies such as DACAAR and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). ARC was also among the first to develop a "targeting method" in accord with Afghan culture. Women beneficiaries were targeted through women's own network, and not through key male actors within the communities.

47. It is appropriate to credit ARC for having been among the first to impress upon the UN agencies that women's issues ought to be a serious concern. It pushed UNHCR in particular to take a firmer stand on the issue. Later, towards the end of 1980s, as the leadership among fundamentalist Afghan parties consistently criticized the ARC Director for promoting women's projects, and as mullahs in the camps continuously agitated refugee villagers against the women's projects, the programme was dropped by ARC.

48. In its enthusiasm, the ARC leadership neglected the lessons of history concerning modernization attempts and the resistance of traditionalist Afghan

III. STRUCTURAL ASPECT

"The first myth of management is that it exists.
The second myth of management is that
success equals skill".

Robert Heller, 1972

i) Structure of ARC

49. The management structure of ARC evolved in keeping with the increase in scale and scope of its activities. Starting from scratch in a very rudimentary manner, the structure grew more and more complex until in 1993 it became almost unmanageable. The comparative organograms showing the ARC management structure attached to this Report as Annex II.

50. The 1993 structure dominated by the newly constituted Peshawar Management Board represented an attempt at "collective management" by Afghans. Five "managers" or "spokesmen" for each of the five main sectors of activity of ARC, took policy decisions together, each holding more or less a veto power. While the system gave a degree of self-confidence to the "group of managers", it also made the decision-making process quite complicated. The collective sharing of responsibility meant that everyone (and therefore no one) was responsible for the shortcomings. The system had a brief life-span and was abruptly ended by the Vienna Board. At the time of the Team's visit, the earlier system of 1992 had been more or less revived but, in reality, ARC Peshawar appeared concerned more about the phasing-out activities than about its own structure. The uncertainties regarding the future were casting a shadow over both the institutional structure and the team spirit.

51. The Team noted that ARC was not alone either in facing structural problems or in suffering from the phasing-out process. The structures of most

NGOs grew on an ad hoc basis and expanded or shrank on the basis of availability of funds. Since the fall of the Kabul régime and the disorderly take over by the Mujahideen, most NGOs have had difficulty to adjust to the radical change in circumstances and to the disappearance of the cause which had ensured financial support to them during the Cold War. Continued fighting inside Afghanistan, donor fatigue, a hardening of Pakistan Government policy at central and provincial levels were together militating against the once flourishing NGO community of Peshawar. In its discussions with ACBAR members, the Team noted the rapid decline in the NGO presence in the area. The local market is getting flooded with Afghans, formerly employed by foreign NGOs at salaries much higher than the local standards.

ii) Centralisation of decision-making

52. From the outset, the decision-making process within ARC, whether in Vienna or Peshawar, has revolved around personalities dominating the scene. Analysing the RDP component of ARC in its report, the NOVIB team looked into the three approaches usually observed in the rural development programmes:

i) managerial approach ii) participatory approach and iii) representative approach.

The Report favoured, of course, the participatory approach but the NOVIB team found that, in varying degrees, all these approaches were being simultaneously followed. The Evaluation Team applied the same test to other ARC activities and found that the same pattern applied *mutatis mutandis*, to all of them. The participatory approach in the Afghan socio-cultural context ends up being the representative approach. In the case of ARC, the managerial approach was predominant although, for optical reasons and in order to gain support for managerial decisions, a pattern of "consultation" with leaders and beneficiaries was followed.

53. The first Chairman of the ARC Vienna Board and the first Director of ARC, Peshawar, both of whom stayed in those positions for most part of ARC's life-span, were each a strong personality. Their authority or the decisions they took were seldom, if at all, questioned or disputed. This pattern of decision-making, which many observers considered autocratic, had its pros and cons. Since the two agreed

on most of the issues they jointly addressed, the decisions were clear out. On the other hand, the flaws in those decisions could hardly be eliminated. The two stayed too long in their command positions and over-shadowed other actors, both in Vienna and in the field. They were both committed to their tasks and as long as the strong central leadership lasted, the structural weaknesses of ARC remained hidden. When the first Director left after almost a decade, the problems surfaced. When the first Chariman died, the problems began turning into a serious internal crisis.

54. In 1993, ARC Peshawar had two traumatic shocks from which it has not and probably will not, recover:

i) the sudden death in June 1993 of the first ARC Chairman who had led ARC since its inception.

ii) the sudden public announcement in the late fall by the ARC Vienna Board that ARC will cease to exist as of 31 December 1993.

The Evaluation Team found that while no one could have done anything about the first shock, the second could have been handled very differently and certainly less brusquely. In retrospect, it seems that the announcement was premature and the grounds had not been adequately prepared. The news spread like wild fire in the Afghan and the NGO community in Peshawar. It did harm to ARC's reputation, particularly since it was accompanied by the firing of some of the key figures within ARC and rumours of financial and administrative mishaps. It also made the task of orderly phasing out more difficult.

iii) Proliferation of activities

55. Since ARC had no pre-determined clear-cut conceptual framework, as noted in Section II of this Report, the mushrooming of activities was inevitable, particularly since the centralised decision-making did not leave much room for critical scrutiny. Roughly from mid-80s on, ARC was spread too thin on the ground through a plethora of sectoral and sub-sectoral activities. Availability of funds from a variety of donors seemed to be the decisive criterion, rather than ARC's structural capacity or operational ability. Consequently, the implementation of projects became a challenge which ARC faced bravely but not always successfully. Section VI of this Report provides an overall view of the ARC activities whose diversity

exacerbated the structural weaknesses.

iv) ARC Peshawar versus ARC Vienna

56. One of the most problematic aspects of ARC has been the relationship between ARC Peshawar and ARC Vienna. The Team could not identify any documents which clearly laid out the terms of reference of the Vienna Board or the field set-up which it supervised in its capacity as the principal policy-making entity. Similarly, no "modus operandi" for the two seems to have been clearly defined. As long as the leadership in Vienna and Peshawar agreed (often verbally) on what needed to be done, and how, there were no major problems. But the structural weakness persisted.

57. Several interlocutors confirmed to the Team that in actual fact, Peshawar did what it thought best in the field, regardless of Vienna. At times, Vienna was informed post-factum. More often than not, the Director and the Chairman of the Vienna board took decisions without other major actors in Peshawar or Vienna participating fully in the decision-making process.

58. In 1993, when the Peshawar structure was radically changed and a Management Board took over, the ARC experiment with "collective management" began. It was short-lived. It turned out that the five managers had difficulty to become a homogenous team. Personality problems coupled with the problem of each manager considering his area of activity to be "the priority" made management of ARC a greater challenge than had been foreseen. In addition, the Board started having problems with ARC Vienna, collectively or individually. Theoretically, the idea of management control by the Afghans who were familiar with the field conditions, was an attractive one. In practice, it became a free-for-all struggle with attendant problems of group politics, protégés, conjectures and gossip as well as some real problems of financial and administrative management.

59. It is interesting to note that neither the Vienna Board nor the Austrian Government, which by then had assumed a much greater share of the financial burden of ARC than before, took any concrete steps to address the structural

problems. The only action taken eventually was to disband the Peshawar Management Board, followed soon by the announcement of the imminent closure of ARC. Since 1990 and particularly during last year, there has been more accentuated struggle between Peshawar and the Vienna Board, sustained by the latter's effort to regain control of ARC's field activities. On the whole, it gave the impression to many in Peshawar of the Metropole trying to assert its authority vis-à-vis distant rebellious chieftains. These efforts from Vienna came too late and have been only partially successful.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECT

"One man's red tape is another man's system"

Dwight Waldo, 1946

Administration of ARC

60. It has been pointed out in the preceding section that as the activities of ARC expanded, its structure became increasingly complex and cumbersome. This inevitably had an impact on the administrative aspect. The ratio between funds spent on projects as compared to funds spent on personnel did not stand to logic. For example, in 1989, ARC spent Rs33.3 million on projects and Rs 9.7 million on personnel. Three years later, in 1992, it spent Rs 15.6 million on projects and Rs 13.1 million on personnel. Last year, the situation improved but the ratio remained quite disquieting. (For details, see Annex III.) It can be argued that ARC was providing more services than goods. Hence the high component of staff salaries. But as the chart (Annex III) covering a period of five years shows, the fluctuations were too big. This points to unsteady programme planning and/or implementation.

61. In administrative terms, the Peshawar office(s) dominated the scene. This is partly explained by the fact that most ARC activities were concentrated in and around Peshawar area. However moving PHC administration to Mardan proved beneficial to the project and to ARC as a whole. It should be emphasized that in terms of financial cost, the main office in Peshawar led the rest of ARC. This was mainly because "some" of the senior staff had extremely high salaries as compared to the vast majority of ARC personnel.

62. In 1991, ADC got involved with ARC for "administrative purposes". It was not given any related policy-making functions. Not having a say in policy matters appears to have been a handicap for ADC in carrying out administrative tasks as effectively as it could have, particularly since the ADC manager had direct field experience of ARC, having served in Peshawar for two years prior to his present position. The Secretary-General of ARC Vienna served as the essential link between ADC, ARC and the field. Several persons drew the attention of the Team

to problems of coordination between Peshawar and Vienna and between ADC and ARC to ensure rational administration.

63. Micro-management by remote control can be both challenging and hazardous. It seems that at times Vienna tried to micro-manage Peshawar when it should have limited itself to marco-management. Conversely Peshawar did considerable amount of macro-management (sometimes without the support or even knowledge of Vienna) and neglected micro-management problems, particularly during the eighties.

ii) Recruitment Policy

64. The Team found scanty evidence of a consistent recruitment policy. In the case of senior officials, the recruitment was done on the basis of ad hoc head-hunting. In the case of local staff, the recruitment was more or less linked to "buddy business" and the local system of "cousins and cousins of cousins". Although the Team did not go into the details of individual recruitment, there were indications that nepotism may have had a role to play in the recruitment system of ARC throughout its life span.

65. Just as the recruitment policy seems to have been really a non-policy, so the salary system was in effect a non-system. The highest paid Afghan staff member could be receiving a salary almost a hundred times more than the lowest paid Afghan. Likewise, managers of comparable rank and responsibilities could be receiving totally different salaries for similar amount and level of work: one Afghan manager could be getting ten times more than another manager. Such big differences in remuneration sometimes caused tensions and hostility among colleagues.

66. ARC also tended to recruit for top job Afghans living abroad, often with nationality and passports of their country of habitual residence. Because of their status and salaries, it is conceivable that, at best, they were envied and, at worst, resented. Mostly, these Afghans were German-speaking. This, of course, facilitated contact with their Austrian interlocutors but the relevance of the knowledge of

German language to the work they were expected to do in Pakistan or Afghanistan seems debatable. Almost all the work of ARC is done in English while local contacts and technical work with beneficiaries is in Pashtu. German is used by the privileged few for the telephone conversations and "privileged" correspondence. Its use cannot be considered a confidence-building measure in the Team.

67. In terms of recruitment and eventual utilisation of human resources, one of the handicaps of ARC also appears to have been its relaxed attitude towards "job descriptions". These were often lacking at the time of recruitment. The eventual performance of the staff member could not be assessed in comparison to the scope and limits of his duties, as perceived by him and/or as expected by the employer. It should be recognized, however, that in the case of technical staff, the absence of precise job description may not be a major handicap. However, its existence would have been helpful both to the administration and the staff member concerned.

68. As of December 1993, ARC staff amounted to 255 persons. Of these, 238 were Afghans, 12 were Pakistanis and 5 were expatriates. A breakdown of the ARC staff is contained in Annex IV. A list of staff by location and job titles is contained in Annex V, while Annex VI provides a more detailed breakdown including budget provisions for each location and a description of activities.

69. At the time of the Team's visit, ARC management in Peshawar was engaged in the phasing out process, concentrating mainly on the discontinuation of services of the staff engaged in various ARC projects. Because of relative lack of administrative discipline in the past, considerable difficulties were being encountered to locate and recuperate ARC property items and to determine equitable compensation packages as severance pay for staff members. In this context, the tensions and mutual grievances which have characterized Peshawar/Vienna relations were relatively more apparent.

iii) Problems: Peshawar/Vienna

70. The Team noted that problems between Peshawar and Vienna have had a lot to do with ambiguity and misperceptions regarding: "who is in charge of what". During the 80's, Peshawar office under its first Director had been fairly autonomous, with the support of the first Chairman. Since then, there has been constant struggle (as noted in the preceding section of this Report) on the part of the Vienna Board members to fully grasp what has been going on in the field and to wrest control of the Programme from the Peshawar group. This did not necessarily mean taking over micro-management but rather to assert the authority of ARC Board and to make Peshawar feel and fully accept that its work is supervised and directed by the Vienna Board. The problem of "power struggle" was exacerbated when the Peshawar Management Board was established and the struggle moved from tensions between individuals to confrontation between the two Boards.

71. In retrospect, it seems that it would have been much better if the role and responsibility of the Vienna Board had been clear to all concerned from the outset. As it is, Peshawar perceived Vienna mainly as the provider of funds, ensuring liaison with donors. Likewise, the Vienna Board could have been more effective if it had had from the beginning, a modicum of staff support locally through a paid Secretariat which could oversee ARC activities, foresee developments and identify appropriate measures to be taken by the Board. The voluntary efforts made by the Board members and the time and energy they spent on purely humanitarian grounds are most commendable. It would have been appropriate if these were sustained in Vienna by a small qualified paid staff. In this context, the Team also noted that ARC would have gained by a broader role of ADC. Similarly, Vienna Board performance would have gained if BKA/ADC, as a major donor, had exercised more their "droit de regard" and provided more guidance and support.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECT

"No one would remember the Good Samaritan if he only had good intentions. He had money as well".

Margaret Thatcher, 1980

i) Financial sources/Fundraising strategy

72. ARC began in 1980 with a modest budget of Rs 4.2 million. Three years later, the budget had more than doubled. Six years later, in 1986, the budget was almost seven times the start-up budget. It peaked in 1989 at Rs 51.9 million. The financial input of ARC over the whole period, 1980-93, is summed up in the chart attached hereto as Annex VII.

73. One of the most remarkable features of ARC has been its financial base and its fund-raising strategy. Although ARC bore a distinctly Austrian mark, its financial support came as much from non-Austrian sources as from Austrian Government and public sources. In fact, for many years, non-Austrian funds equalled or exceeded the total direct Austrian contributions. The expansion in the activities of ARC was, in large measure, due to the availability of such funds from different sources. As indicated in the external auditors reports which the Team examined, there were occasions when the donors were returned unspent funds.

74. ARC received contributions to its projects from a dozen governmental, non-governmental and UN sources. Besides the Austrian sources, funds came notably from Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland as well as UNDP and UNHCR. With the transfer of most NGO activities inside Afghanistan and ARC's difficulties in that context, the donor support started dwindling, forcing ARC to do some self-examination. However, even for winding-up activities, ARC still had at the time of Team's visit substantial funds representing savings from various projects.

in order to gain a holistic view of ARC, particularly since almost half the funds expended by ARC have been devoted in recent years to its activities inside Afghanistan. (A comparative financial view of ARC activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the last three years is contained in Annex IX.) One of the serious practical problems relating to work inside Afghanistan, particularly in the rural areas, is that there are no banks and no reliable official system for transfer of funds. This means total dependence on individuals for carrying and keeping large sums of money in cash. There have been innumerable cases within the NGO community of cash getting lost or stolen. One of the employees of ARC reported the "theft" of some Rs 700,000 of ARC money that he was carrying inside Afghanistan. There have been cases where funds or equipment belonging to ARC and made available to staff could not be accounted for. Several cases of misuse or disappearance of ARC property ranging from medicine to tools and equipment were brought to the attention of the Team. The fact that such incidents have occurred frequently also in other NGOs does not justify lack of adequate precautions by ARC leadership. The details of mishaps that came to the attention of the Team are beyond the scope of this Report. It is clear, however, that both in the choice of some of its employees and in the methods used for implementation of projects, particularly inside Afghanistan, ARC did not demonstrate enough prudence or perspicacity. The blame should go as much to the individuals that might be involved as to the relative lack of financial monitoring and control mechanisms within ARC.

iv) Financial situation: Present & future

79. ARC evolved very well in terms of its relationship with donors. As indicated in the preceding sections of this Report, ARC's overall objectives were nebulous, its activities too diverse but pragmatic and, fortunately the results on the whole were quite satisfactory. Even though Austrian governmental and public support to ARC represents only half the financial story, it can be said that Austria and Austrians gained respect and repute in Pakistan and among the Afghans due to ARC activities.

80. The Evaluation Team was not expected to go into details of dollars and cents but it noted that at present, several million rupees from past savings are

available to ARC for covering a substantial part of the phasing out expenses including severance payments to a large number of staff members. ARC Peshawar is also continuing to seek funds to sustain some of the on-going projects until clear and firm decisions are taken regarding their future. As for the future, it would be appropriate to convene a donor meeting as has been done in the past, to chalk out the course of action regarding those activities which should continue, regardless of whether ARC in its present form and composition continues to exist.

VI. OPERATIONAL ASPECT

"Conciliis abundantibus, sine concilio
progrediendum."

(Amid a multiple of projects, no plan is devised)

Publius Syrus, 1st c., A.D.

i) Rationale of ARC projects

81. According to its General Policy statement (July 1991), ARC is "an NGO with no political or religious affiliations, working to help war-affected Afghans in Pakistan and Afghanistan." The main purpose of ARC was to promote self-sufficiency and its projects were intended to "help Afghans help themselves". Short term survival/relief programmes were to be turned gradually towards development in viable communities.

82. ARC hoped, as a matter of policy, to encourage "active participation of its staff and of communities (for example, through Shuras) in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of its work and to treat all members of a community equally". Target beneficiaries were to be preferably disadvantaged groups e.g. women, children, the illiterate, the poor and the disabled. Interestingly, one of ARC's aims was to give "priority to the recruitment of disabled staff as long as their disability did not adversely affect the quality of their work". Furthermore, ARC was to "work with donors who share its aims and do not control its policies". ARC also endeavoured to cooperate with other non-governmental bodies working in related skill fields and within the same geographical area.

83. As will be seen in the following paragraphs, ARC succeeded only partially to achieve its objectives. The beneficiaries of its projects were not targeted except geographically. In any event, a clear statement of objectives seems to have been elaborated eleven years after the inception of ARC. The Team could not locate any

other cohesive statement in the ARC archives besides the annual reports and various mission reports. These included statements of intent or "dressed-up" accounts of achievements. However, notwithstanding the policy statement referred to above, if one compares the general performance of ARC to other similar NGOs in Pakistan working for Afghans, the level of success of ARC remains fully defensible and commendable.

ii) Critique of projects

A. Health

84. The Primary Health Care/Basic Health Units (PHC/BHU) is the oldest project of ARC. Originally launched in 1980 as mobile curative medical units, it was re-structured in 1981 to permanent BHUs in three refugee camps and expanded gradually from 1982 up to its present status as an integrated primary health care system.

85. The health care system includes five service components:

- (i) curative activities (incl. diagnostic activities, laboratory examinations, referral to hospital, provision of essential drugs, dressing, injections, minor surgery and dental care);
- (ii) preventive activities (incl. Immunization of communicable diseases, TB control, malaria control, control of diarrhoeal diseases, control of acute respiratory diseases and environmental sanitation);
- (iii) health promotive activities (incl. ante-natal care, supervised deliveries, post-natal care, under-five clinics, child spacing, home visits, school health, health education);
- (iv) nutrition rehabilitation and physiotherapy; and
- (v) training activities, including: (a) training of community health workers (CHWs) and traditional birth attendants (TBAs), dental health workers, malaria supervisors, lab technicians; and (b) in-service training of staff and volunteers.

86. To date mental care (such as trauma treatment or other psychological disorders common among refugee populations) is not a part of PHC. A few

initiatives reportedly launched by the previous coordinator have had no follow-up.

87. Since 1989 a training centre has been a part of the PHC Mardan office. Seven lady health visitors, 250 CHWs and TBAs trained under the in-service training programme, form a network of out-reach services covering fully the camps. In 1988, a children's park was established next to the BHU in Gandaf for primary education of girls and training in handicraft for income-generation purposes.

88. The PHC/BHUs is run by 85 staff members. Ten are Pakistani, mostly placed at the top management levels. A deliberate policy of hiring multi-skilled persons for non-professional jobs has been applied for some time. At present some 75 per cent of the total employees have worked themselves up into the staff from previous positions as volunteer CHWs in particular. Consequently, they know the work involved from bottom-up. The Team noted that a priority to recruit suitable disabled staff members was not reported.

89. BHUs are open to men and women on alternating two days a week, for children four days a week. One day a week is for home visits. Beyond office hours, CHWs and TBAs make referrals directly to hospital. No mishaps were reported to have occurred in this connection.

90. The programme is targeting ca. 31,000 refugees in Baghicha, Gandaf and Kagan refugee camps. About 55 per cent of the beneficiaries are below the age of fifteen. Half of the patients in the Kagan BHU are Pakistani villagers who reportedly happily travel from a distance of upto 20 kms. to receive medical care at the BHU. The Pakistanis not knowing fully the procedures of the BHUs are sometimes treated last, and consequently feel somewhat discriminated against.

91. Since the malaria epidemic struck the Frontier Province in 1989, the PHC has served as counterpart for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in testing out the effect of malaria eradication measures for the target population.

Health findings

92. The Team found that health programmes have taken 5-6 years to capture the target population as a whole. The main difficulty has been to reach the women: a satisfactory female attendance of 80-85 per cent was not attained until 1989. Preventive health measures were launched 2-4 years after curative measures, and systematic evaluations of the various forms of treatment were not applied as a steering tool to meet the needs of the population.

93. Nonetheless, already in the course of a few years of operation, the PHC programme had considerable impact on the refugee camp population and immense improvement of the health conditions of the refugees has been achieved.

94. In 1985, infant mortality had fallen from one of the highest in the world to a level below that of Pakistani average in 1990 (from 156 to 81) and the under-five mortality rate from 225 to 101, mainly due to the immunization programme. By 1992 the rates had decreased to 19 and 28 respectively corresponding to infant- and under five mortality rates of advanced Western societies, primarily due to the health promotive activities. The Team is not aware of any other refugee situation where similar results have ever been achieved.

95. By 1993 all births were attended by TBAs trained under the PHC programme and CHWs were, reportedly, able to reach the total male population. Approximately 100 women were covered by the child spacing programme. However, increasing interest is being shown by both women and men; the women directly to BHU staff, the men to CHWs.

96. Involvement of men in the work for women has proved to be of paramount importance. Literacy programmes for girls and the child spacing programme, two most sensitive types of programmes in the Afghan society, gained momentum only after consultation with men, and male resentment has been dealt with by the ARC/PHC Coordinator through discussions with worried men.

Comments

97. The operation of the BHUs as such and the children's park at Gandaf

appears to have generated interest in education, training and income-generation among adolescent girls and women to such an extent that further extension of the Women in Development (WID) sector based on outreach services would seem to be desirable. Through the PHC lady health visitor programme, primary education instructors may be introduced to the refugees. Their acceptance could be relatively rapidly gained.

98. Scope for expansion exists also with regard to mental care. Psychotherapeutic training of CHWs and TBAs seems feasible. Both were found to serve as health advisors to the communities within their respective areas. They generally seem to have a good feeling for the health situation of the individual households. Additionally, family planning measures addressed at males, campaigns for delaying child births to after the age of twenty among certain tribal groups (from Kunar mainly), as well as education in compound/environment sanitation and hygiene, could successfully become part of their responsibility in the near future since these areas touch on their present roles in the communities.

99. The Team further found that PHC collaboration with innovative research-oriented agencies such as MSF in the area of malaria control is a promising one. It links up the programme to research. At a later stage, the PHC could become a centre of research itself. Both the interest and the potential of the staff seem to be there.

100. At the time of the evaluation, the Mardan PHC/BHU programme was planned for extension into Afghanistan. It is our view however that under the present circumstances, extension into Pakistani communities seems to be a more logical evolution of the programme. It would improve the service to the Pakistanis, and prevent unhealthy competition and antagonism between refugees and locals over access health care. Given the more advanced health conditions of the Pakistani population (in comparison to that of the Afghan refugees in 1980), it would seem important to place more emphasis on health promotive activities already from the onset of the programme than was previously done. With regard to Afghanistan, as long as the present chaotic conditions prevail, PHC Mardan could be, if required, a natural forum for development and implementation of baseline data surveys and

training of CHWs and TBAs to be dispatched to the rural communities of the country.

101. To achieve proper planning, it is important to ensure financial commitments from donors for 5 to 6 years. It is equally important that the release of funding for the last 3 years be preceded by external evaluation. A fund-raising strategy and some training for fund-raising would be useful for the coordinator of the PHC to facilitate long-term financial stability. *

102. As for the long-term perspective of PHC, BHUs may be developed into community development centres for medical care, education, training and income-generation services, as well as, possibly, food production etc. so that the needs of the population are taken care of in a holistic way. For the people concerned, an improvement of their level of living takes more than good health, and the BHUs have become firm institutions of everyday life to which one can turn at times of need. BHUs now are within the reach of most women and thus provide a natural forum for extension of non-medical services to the entire population.

103. In this respect, development of close links with like-minded NGOs is likely to strengthen the work of the PHC, its financial stability as well as its bargaining position vis-a-vis donors.

104. Finally, the Team wishes to emphasize that PHC is by far the most successful project of ARC. It is continuing to make steady progress and must not be allowed to wither away. In the context of the overall changes in strategy regarding ARC and its future, PHC should receive special attention. Careful analysis and planning should precede further actions from Vienna side. Should it be decided to turn PHC into an independent NGO, expert advice should be sought for NGO establishment and development. Such advice should include orientation regarding the conceptual framework, objectives and the means to achieve them.

B. Sanitation

105. The sanitation programme including latrine construction and maintenance,

sanitation-, health- and hygiene education and installation of handpumps (one pump per ten households) was launched in 1982. Latrines were of the simple Ventilated Improved Pit (VIP) design. The programme provided a latrine slab, a cover and a ventilation pipe to families who had committed themselves to the programme and beforehand had dug a pit and built a superstructure according to instructions provided by the programme.

106. Three teams operated in the refugee camps consisting of two field officers, two lady health visitors and support staff, to supervise latrine construction and maintenance, provide on-the-spot education in the relationship between sanitation and health as also environmental sanitation within and outside compounds. The lady health visitors had sessions with female family members in which they also promoted ongoing vaccination campaigns (of the BHUs), malaria control measures for the compound (malaria net, especially), compound and personal hygiene. *

107. In 1992, the programme was fully funded by external sources. One year later, in 1993, it was branched out as an independent local NGO, "The Pakistani Community Development Project", run by Pakistani personnel and supported by its own funding base (Oxfam, UNICEF etc.)

Sanitation findings

108. Since the beginning of the operation, 30 refugee camps have been covered. Some 100,000 latrines and handpumps have been constructed. More than half a million refugees have been reached. The programme has also been assisting the Local Government and Rural Development Department (LGRDD) in developing a sanitation programme for Pakistani citizens. Over the years, the sanitation programme has become a trademark of ARC and the agency became renowned for hygienic latrine construction.

109. The Team found that the sanitation has had a tremendous impact on the conditions of the refugees as far as provision of hygienic latrines is concerned. Of the total household population residing in the three camps of Baghicha, Gandaf and Kagan, (about 4,000 families), only 32 did not yet have a latrine. In the households

visited by the Team at random, latrines were clean and well-maintained.

110. It appeared, however, that the understanding of sanitation and hygiene, and the impact on good health, is rather limited. There was no separation between animals and humans inside compound areas, and animal waste was found lying next to the family food, at times close to the space for food preparation, and to reservoirs for consumption water (for personal hygiene). A great many households also still practised open dungheaps in a hole in the compound yard for waste from the kitchen, animals and humans. Nearby compound areas were, in some places, rather messy and distinctly unhygienic.

Comments

111. The sanitation programme seems to have addressed the needs of the beneficiaries and represents a semi-technical approach to meeting the requirements of the population to a certain extent. A holistic view of the life within a compound would have extended the benefits, and the complexity of the needs of the family could have been addressed earlier. The Team felt that an extensive follow-up health education, combined with practical instructions in safe disposal of waste within the compound and in nearby areas, as well as a separation of animals from humans, would be necessary in order to provide for good health for all, and a safe environment, on a long-term basis. Since the ARC sanitation programme is now terminated as such, it would be natural for the PHC/BHU programme to help in this regard, as mentioned above.

C. Technical Training (TTC)

112. In 1986, ARC initiated a technical training programme with the objective of providing refugees with marketable skills which would enable them to make a sustainable living and which, eventually, would help in the reconstruction of their war-ravaged homeland. Two technical training centres were established one in Akora Khatak refugee camp (1986) and another in Munda (1987). A curriculum was developed and textbooks prepared by the agency. A trainee recruitment policy was worked out. The training skills included masonry, carpentry, tinsmithery, weld-

ing/blacksmithery, electric and radio repair. The courses took one year. The ratio between practical and theoretical training was 75 and 25 per cent respectively. Up to 1991, literacy and numeracy were a part of the technical training courses, while theology, English and arithmetic were taught separately. At the time of the evaluation ca. 1,150 trainees had graduated.

113. From 1986 to 1990, trainees were recruited through campaigns in the two refugee camps and tested individually for motivation, technical flair and primary education. Only three disabled trainees have been traced among the recruited in the documents of ARC. Trainees were selected among males aged 18-35 from all regions of Afghanistan. Transport to the training centres was free of charge. Trainees received a monthly stipend of 400 Rupees as well as working clothes. Up to 1989, no follow-up was included. As from 1990, each graduate also received a tool kit. A monitoring team supervised progress made by the graduates in establishing themselves in self-employment and other forms of enterprise and provided the needed technical assistance. In the period 1990 to spring 1992, a credit scheme supplied loans to graduates of 2,500 rupees repayable within 12 months. Approximately 60 per cent of all loans were reportedly paid back.

114. Upto 1991, the demand for traineeships was far greater than the number of places available, and the best incumbents could be selected. In 1991, the local market for craftsmen was found saturated in Munda and Akora Khatak. Trainees had to be recruited from a number of camps in and around Peshawar, and the proportion of literate applicants had declined by 70-80 per cent since 1990.

115. By 1992, the situation had changed markedly. The political situation inside Afghanistan prompted hundreds of thousands of refugees to return home. Munda refugee camp was vacated. Its technical training centre was moved to the University town in Peshawar. Preparations to move the two centres inside Afghanistan began. Courses were shortened to six months, and literacy and numeracy cut out, as an interim measure until the full courses could be re-established inside the home country. As a result, only 46 trainees graduated in the course of 1992. In autumn 1993, funds from ADC were discontinued. Akora Khatak was closed down while activities in Canal Road were continued by ARC

Peshawar on funding provided by other sources (Norwegian Church Aid). Negotiations on handing over the TTC activities to an Afghan NGO had been initiated with "Help the Afghan Farmer Organization" (HAFO). It should be noted that it is only these "interim" courses which the Team visited.

Training findings

116. Of the total of some 1150 graduates from the two technical training centres, at least 25 per cent have been traced as having established themselves in business. This percentage refers to the number of self-employed known to TTC staff present and former. It could, therefore, be a minimum estimate. In reality, the percentage may be higher. In Akora Khatak, a number of small-scale craftsmen cooperatives of 2-3 people had reportedly been formed by TTC graduates. One-man businesses established by TTC graduates also seemed widespread in that camp. In addition, a small percentage (less than 5%) have found employment within the NGO sector of Peshawar. Others work for large contractors in Hyderabad (Sindh). Employment has been generated in all trades except electric and radio repair. Average income reportedly ranges from 50 to 80 rupees per day (1,250 to 2,000 rupees per month) which is a relatively good monthly income in Pakistan, albeit many employed graduates most probably might not be employed on full-time basis, given the volatile conditions of the labour market in Pakistan prevailing at the moment.

117. Also, since 1991, graduates from Munda and later Canal Road tended to return to Afghanistan. That process has continued. More than 40 graduates from that centre have been traced inside Afghanistan, in particular in Kunduz and Jalalabad, where their skills in masonry, carpentry and welding have proved most in demand. Average incomes reportedly fell to 7,000-10,000 Afghanis or just over one third the level in Pakistan.

118. At the time of the evaluation, the TTC in Akora Khatak was nothing more than empty buildings and unused equipment. Still, four chowkidars were employed to look after the remnants. In Canal Road, 60 trainees were enrolled, twelve per

trade, while the total staff amounted to 21 persons. When the team visited the TTC, only students of masonry, carpentry, welding/blacksmithery and tinsmithery were attending the courses, i.e. merely 6-7 trainees per trade (approx. 50-60 % attendance rate). There were no students at all in electric/radio repair. The entire class had reportedly left to attend a funeral.

Comments

119. The technical training programme has played an important role in making a part of the refugee communities self-sustaining. It has also provided a meaningful alternative to the group of Afghan men who never had the chance to receive more than the most elementary education, if any at all. The importance of this cannot be over-emphasized.

120. It appears, however, that the demand for craftsmen in and around Peshawar is now saturated, while the need inside Afghanistan is immense, and will continue to be so, until the reconstruction phase ends. It would therefore be important to resume, in some appropriate form and context, the technical training activities on full scale inside Afghanistan, including literacy and numeracy courses.

121. The training should, however, be limited to basic reconstruction crafts like masonry, carpentry, welding/blacksmithery which are and will continue to be in great demand in Afghanistan. These could be supplemented by elementary business trades such as accounting and type writing.

122. Also as the population of Afghanistan includes 12 to 15 per cent disabled, future TTC programming, if any, inside Afghanistan should develop and implement as a specific policy, recruitment of a certain number of disabled trainees per year, and thus live up to the intention of ARC to give priority to disabled people for positions where handicap is no hindrance. ARC has, in the past, neglected to do so.

D. Activities inside Afghanistan

123. The terms of reference of the Evaluation Team did not include a visit to

project sites inside Afghanistan and was, consequently, not expected to assess the projects relating to ARC activities inside Afghanistan. These activities have, however, occupied a prominent place in the overall output of ARC and, as indicated in Annex ix tended to overtake the rest of the Programme in terms of financial input. A holistic view of ARC cannot be gained without paying attention to its activities inside Afghanistan which were initiated in Qandahar in 1985 and are, at present, concentrated in Ghazni, Jalalabad and Logar.

124. During its field mission, the Team met willy-nilly with the Afghan project leaders of practically all ARC projects inside Afghanistan. They happened to be visiting the main office in Peshawar and were keen to make their views and perceptions known to the Team. All of them were deeply concerned about the future of their projects and worried about the reactions of the communities with which they work, regarding possible discontinuation of ARC projects.

125. ADC is the main funding source of projects inside Afghanistan. Consequently, the position taken by the Austrian Government is of great importance. In particular, it is essential that the results hitherto achieved, even if below expectations of donors, are not entirely lost through hasty action. An orderly phasing-out and/or hand-over to other NGOs would be in order.

126. The Team was impressed by the incredible variety of activities initiated by ARC since 1985. The Team found this plethora of projects commendably ambitious but hopelessly unrealistic. The dominant component, Rural Development Programme (RDP) alone included: i) wheat seed trials and multiplication; ii) tree nurseries; iii) vegetable production; iv) LEISA and plant production; v) veterinary services; vi) animal husbandry; vii) agriculture extension and training; viii) food security and nutrition; ix) engineering (public works) and x) sundry income-generating activities (such as bee keeping).

127. In a related field, women's activities in the context of WID, included poultry and livestock. In addition, Afghan women were involved in Malistan in i) kilim weaving; ii) wool spinning; iii) knitting; iv) namad making and v) soap making. At the same time, the BHU's operating in Khushi (Logar), Behsud (Jalalabad) and

Malistan (Ghazni) were carrying out activities similar to those in Pakistan which have been commented upon earlier in this section of the Report.

128. The "Strategic Planning Exercise" carried out by NOVIB/ARC in July/August 1993 contains detailed analysis of ARC activities and a series of recommendations regarding each sector and sub-sector. The Team found this Report thorough and helpful. The implementation of the recommendations would depend largely on policy decisions that ARC should take in the near future alongwith NOVIB and other potential donors concerning the future of each project. When examining the strategy for phasing out, the Team enquired into the question of ARC property in various locations within Afghanistan. (See Annex X for a full list of ARC Property). It is probably unrealistic to expect the local Afghan community/leaders/shuras to part with the equipment they have been using so that it can be sold or disposed of elsewhere. With the possible exception of some motor bikes, it would also be neither practical nor cost-effective to bring things back to Pakistan and sell them. The best option, even though it may involve some effort, would be to make arrangements with some other NGOs to continue the work initiated by ARC at the present locations (or at best within the region, if the leaders concerned agree). Another option being considered at present is the creation of new Afghan NGOs which can be helped initially by ARC and others to carry on independently. This option requires careful preparation and analysis and should be followed in the framework of the current practice of expatriate NGOs and in accordance with clear guide-lines established by Vienna. (For a comprehensive account of ARC "achievements" inside Afghanistan, see Annex XI. It is a rather self-congratulatory succinct report provided to the Team by the RDP leadership).

E. Relief/Development Aid continuum

129. ARC had determined early on that its relief activities and emergency assistance should move as soon as feasible to development. Theoretically, it was a well-founded intention. In fact, it is now increasingly clear to aid practitioners and policy-makers that relief aid should be intrinsically linked to development so that the impact of the investment by donors is durable and salutary as regards the eventual self-sufficiency of beneficiaries. ARC succeeded only partly in achieving its

stated goal. In the field of primary health care and sanitation/hygiene, ARC activities were close to development type activities not long after the initiation of project. Similarly, the training programmes of ARC were also tuned to capacity-building. The activities inside Afghanistan revolving around rural development were similarly based on general development philosophy. However, by and large, the overall situation of Afghan refugees/returnees remained in a state of emergency or, at least, was so perceived by aid agencies. The result was that ARC, like many other NGO's never fully entered the development domain as such.

130. Strategic thinking should have normally led ARC to select a few key sectors where a well-developed infra-structure would have sustained efforts in favour of a durable long-term impact. In this case, relief activities or emergency aid would have had a limited pre-determined time-frame giving way in a gradual but systematic way to developmental activities. It can be argued, of course, that most donors respond more readily to emergencies than to long-term development projects. Exigencies of circumstances led ARC to provide both humanitarian aid as well as developmental type of assistance. ARC had partial success in responding to both needs without fully coming to grips with either.

VII. QUO VADIS ?

"The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today."

Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1945

i) Phasing-out strategy

131. The phasing out would have to be done on the basis of pre-determined criteria which take into account the reality of the situation. Objective and equitable criteria would contain, if not eliminate, possible friction and discontent. It is suggested that clearly defined implementation modalities be established by an external entity, preferably comprising knowledgeable persons, not linked with either the past or the future of the programmes.

132. The phasing out has three components: (i) operational; (ii) financial; and (iii) administrative. The three are interlinked and have to be addressed simultaneously but each calls for a distinct strategy.

133. **The operational component** should have as the basic objective the safeguarding of what has been painstakingly built over more than a decade, which means essentially preserving what is worthwhile in each programme by handing it over to an appropriate NGO in Afghanistan or Pakistan, in close consultation with the authorities concerned.

134. The PHC and related BHUs should become an integrated autonomous Pakistani NGO. Its statutes should be prepared and a carefully constituted Governing Board established. Its work would be oriented as much to the local Pakistani population in the programme areas as to the Afghans. Such transformation is all the more justified since: (a) the Pakistani populations need as much as medical care and have remained relatively neglected; (b) it is unlikely that the majority of Afghans in the camps covered by PHC will return home voluntarily

in the near future, if at all. In the camps covered by PHC, the majority of the population was born and brought up in Pakistan. The camps are almost like Pakistani villages and the populations are fairly well integrated in the local economies.

135. PHC is by far the most successful and best organized of the Austrian supported programmes. The camps are in the periphery of the Northern area of the country and consequently would qualify in the context of the new Austrian foreign aid strategy. It is important, however, that the Government of Austria or the appropriate Austrian entity be not perceived as the sole supporter of the new Pakistani entity although this might be inevitable in the initial period. A consortium of donors, governmental and/or non-governmental, should be established as soon as possible to ensure its medium to long term existence.

136. TTC should be handed over to an Afghanistan based organisation and its activities carried out inside Afghanistan. The trend of the trainees is to set up business inside their home country, and that is exactly where the need for skilled craftsmen is most acute. In this respect, the Team noted that negotiations with "Help the Afghan Farmers Organization" were quite advanced. The projects of the agencies are implemented in Afghanistan. The present Director was formerly among the key staff of TTC for years, and can be assumed to be aware of both the potentiality and shortcomings of the programme. It is nonetheless important that clear guidelines by Vienna serve as the basis for and be an integral part of the hand-over.

137. RDP calls for special attention. Its phasing out or hand-over will require much greater effort than the other components of ARC. In the first place, it would be necessary to undertake evaluation of the projects and serious stock-taking of ARC assets. Negotiations with local leadership and shuras would be necessary. It would be desirable if the stock-taking and overall assessment of the situation is done by ARC alongwith representatives of the entity or entities that would take over the RDP projects. A decision by ARC is also called for with regard to the functions and scope of BHUs working inside Afghanistan. In this connection, the question of providing relief/emergency assistance in the on-going turbulent situation

in the Jalalabad area would require special attention. If BHUs inside Afghanistan are to continue as a part of the proposed new Pakistani entity taking over PHC, then the question of policy regarding activities inside Afghanistan would need to be addressed.

138. **The financial component** should consist of:

- (a) cleaning up the present financial situation internally as well as through eventual external audit;
- (b) identification of unspent funds of the various programmes and consolidation of the overall financial situation of all the programmes (including assets) for the purpose of eventual disposing off or handing over.

139. As regards implementation of the termination phase in financial terms, it should be noted that the contributions of the various donors were significantly underspent during 1993 and, cumulatively, about Rs 5 million might remain available to ARC Peshawar from previous years in addition to assets both in Afghanistan and Pakistan whose actual value is yet to be determined. The exact value of ARC cash and kind assets would become clear only after the regular External Audit exercise has been carried out. The Team felt that the final external audit should be undertaken as soon as possible.

140. **The administrative component:** A plan should be devised for: (i) disposal or transfer of property and equipment (sale and/or gift-giving to one or more partners); and (ii) termination of personnel during the phasing out period about which the staff should be informed in a formal and official manner. At present, there is considerable confusion and tension among the staff. Logically with the decrease in activities, the need for manpower should decrease correspondingly. However, in December 1993, ARC still had 255 staff members. At the time of the evaluation, measures to decrease staff had been initiated but on a minimalist basis. The Director and his senior colleagues were spending considerable time and energy in dealing with staff problems. In the absence of clear guidelines concerning the future of various projects and equitable criteria for discontinuation of staff contracts, the task was all the more arduous. Given the deadline of ARC activities presently set for 30 June 1994, the pace of winding up administrative work and termination of staff

should be considerably accelerated. A core group of a maximum of 10-12 people among the present staff should be left to take care of last minute action and winding up in the month of June. As regards TTC, all staff (51 people) could be terminated as from the date when on-going training courses end (which should coincide with the hand-over mentioned above).

ii) Main actors and their role

141. Phasing-out process must be properly planned and implemented. The role of each actor must be clear, particularly since phasing out is often stressful and emotionally difficult, notably for those more closely linked. This is why it can be useful to involve in the process external individuals / entity with no links to the past or the future of the Programme concerned. It is also important that the main actors get together to chalk out a common strategy and common tactics which diminish the possibility of misunderstandings and eventual grievances. The involvement of the past (and future) donors is equally important.

142. In the case of ARC, the main actors would be BKA, ADC, the Vienna Board and the Peshawar senior management. These should decide, in the first place, as to which donors should be involved, and to what extent. The Team spent very little time in Vienna to gain a thorough understanding of the work methods, professional inter-action and specific thinking of the main actors. It seems, however, that BKA should be the central body to coordinate and guide the process. The overall policy and the official Austrian government attitude can only be determined by BKA. However, it cannot and should not be involved in the micro-management of the phasing-out process. This should be left to ADC and the Vienna Board. Since ADC is the main channel for government support and is responsible for the administrative aspect, it will have a vital role to play. The fact that its senior management has direct and regular experience of ARC would come in handy. The Vienna Board, its Chairman, members and the Secretary-General have played a prominent and active role, in a humanitarian spirit and on a voluntary basis. Their services deserve to be recognised. The phasing-out team would inevitably draw on their experience as well as their knowledge of various aspects of ARC. However,

their direct involvement might be painful, a bit similar to the feelings of parents when children grow up or revolt and leave home. At the same time, they are likely to be subjected to undue pressure and unrealistic requests by the Afghans who would push them around either with gratitude or with recriminations. They will be courted or cursed, depending on the temperament of the individual(s) concerned: Afghans losing their jobs may not always be in good humour. The Team feels, albeit hesitatingly, that these words of caution should be added, not to downplay the role of Vienna Board but to ensure that the phasing-out process is carried out in the best possible atmosphere. The process would involve: i) a meeting in Vienna (with or without donors) to establish the modalities of phasing out; ii) a joint mission in the field (preferably with neutral but knowledgeable outsider(s)); iii) a gradual and smooth phasing out / handing over of ARC projects. Close consultations are also called for with the Afghan leadership as well as with Pakistani authorities at local, provincial and national level. These could be carried out by the joint team mentioned above. In cases where the existing entities are to be turned into Pakistani NGOs, it is of particular importance that the Pakistan Government is involved at the earliest at the highest possible level so that the necessary authorisations and concessions as well as maximum official support is ensured in good time.

iii) Phasing-out action

143. A. Regarding **Property**, it is essential to avoid the scramble that usually follows the phasing-out of NGOs. Clear criteria will need to be established by Vienna (with the advice of Peshawar). At present, the Peshawar office is engaged in identifying and locating various items belonging to ARC. It is only after basic decisions regarding the future of various projects have been taken that it would be possible to determine the best use of various items of ARC property. At the request of the Team, the Peshawar office prepared a list of the main items. It is attached to this Report as Annex X.

144. B. Regarding **Staff**, the Team noted the atmosphere of tension and uncertainty prevailing in all sectors of ARC activities. It would seem that this is not so much due to the fact that ARC is phasing out (many other NGOs are doing the same) but rather that there has been considerable confusion among staff after the

discontinuation of the Peshawar Management Board. Rumours and gossip are mixed up hopelessly with well-founded anxiety and fear. According to the latest ACBAR estimates, some 153 NGOs have stopped relief work inside Afghanistan. Of these 37 were European, 15 North American, 10 from Arab countries and 91 Pakistani and Afghan with a handful Japanese and Australian. When one considers that according to ACBAR, in 1992, NGOs employed 28,433 persons (of whom 25,774 Afghans, 2,024 Pakistanis and 635 expatriates), it is easy to understand the mess in the Peshawar labour market. The tense atmosphere coupled with uncertainty regarding their future makes people short-tempered. The Team noted, however, that with the exception of a few, the ARC Staff members are doing well in relative terms.

145. Inevitably, much of the time of the Team was spent in the field in discussions with the ARC staff, mainly concerning projects but often they were unable to keep their personal problems out of the discussions. Despite reduction in its activities, ARC still maintains a fairly large staff (255 at the time of Team's visit). A breakdown of the staff according to activity, location and cost is contained in Annex V. A recapitulative list is contained in Annex IV. The main problems now facing the Peshawar management are the severance payments where the humanitarian aspect tends to complicate things at times. The management is also helping staff, to the extent possible, to identify alternative means of living. Greater understanding and guidance by Vienna and other donors whose funds are still available to ARC would certainly help greatly the Peshawar management at this stage. The Team feels that the present crisis should be used constructively to bring new vigour to the entities that would inherit the present projects: this is the ideal time to get rid of dead wood and bad grass. It is also the occasion to streamline the salary scales in order to bring them in line with local standards to the extent possible and thus to ensure better their sustainability.

iv) Conclusions

146. ARC did not begin with a clear conceptual framework. It muddled through difficult circumstances, sometimes quite successfully, other times less successfully. If one takes into account not the last three or four years but the whole period of

ARC existence (1980-93), the programme implementation and performance was remarkably good. This was so despite the fact that:

- i) There was lack of clear medium or long-term objectives.
- ii) There was inadequate monitoring of implementation, particularly of projects inside Afghanistan.
- iii) There was inadequate guidance by the top management in Vienna, both governmental and non-governmental.

The ARC field team in Peshawar, left more or less to its own devices, did quite well, despite difficult circumstances and managed to build for ARC commendable reputation.

147. The Evaluation Team did not spend enough time in Vienna to fully comprehend the internal mechanisms (ARC, ADC, BKA) in order to formulate satisfactory conclusions as to how things should be worked out in Vienna. It seems, however, that the real problems regarding overall policy are as much at Vienna level than at Peshawar Level. At this stage, it would be difficult to achieve satisfactory management by "remote control" (ARC, Vienna), or to do "micro-management" when in fact it is "macro-management" which is required.

148. It is important to note that although ARC was clearly perceived as an Austrian undertaking, in fact a large proportion of its funds were non-Austrian. That the ARC teams in Peshawar and Vienna should have been able to keep these external donors sufficiently interested in ARC programmes for so long is a remarkable achievement. With the help of these donors, ARC has, on the whole, done a fine job. Austria is better known to Pakistanis and Afghans, thanks to ARC, than any other Austrian action or undertaking. ARC achievements were made possible by its managers even though most of the funds used were not of Austrian origin. Now in its final stages, ARC should not be allowed to fade away with a sigh. At the present stage, ARC does not have a clear "phasing out" strategy. The concerned Austrian governmental and non-governmental authorities must join hands to preserve the goodwill that ARC has generated through almost fourteen years of its existence among Afghans and Pakistanis.

149. On the one hand, it would be appropriate if all concerned Austrian entities (ARC, ADC and BKA) reach clear conclusions and have a clearly defined policy regarding each component of ARC programmes before undertaking missions or issuing instructions to ARC, Peshawar. Enough information is available in Vienna for policy-formulation. On the other hand, it would also be appropriate after this internal exercise, if BKA would take the initiative to:

(i) establish policy guidelines, for NGO operations, drawing on the lessons learnt during the lifetime of ARC, and test them out in a setting similar to that of the Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan in one of the new Austrian programme countries, for example, Kyrgyzstan or Nepal; and (ii) call a donors' meeting and promote cross-fertilization of ideas and plans for future NGO programmes in Pakistan and elsewhere.


150. It would further be appropriate if ARC after the internal brain-storming would:

(i) organise a workshop in Pakistan, with participation restricted to a few experts, regarding the experiences of ARC and like-minded NGOs, with the available local funds; and (ii) produce a report/booklet covering ARC life span, for wide dissemination in Austria, Pakistan and elsewhere. The achievements of ARC should be more widely known. At the same time, it should be recognised that the lessons of ARC are not confined solely to one agency; they are relevant to many. A number of NGOs could find useful insights in such a document.

ANNEXES


AFGHANISATION

Participation level of Afghan Partners




Courtesy: UNDP/OPS

ARC Management Structure - 1992




ARC Management Structure - 1993



Funds

(Million Rupees)



ARC Staff List, for the year 1993.

<u>Project</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Total Staff Number</u>
Main Office/Train.Dept.	Peshawar	23
Sub Total		23
TTC Head Office	Peshawar	4
TTC Akora	Akora Camp	19
TTC Canal Road	Canal Road	19
TTC Malistan	Ghazni/Malistan	9
Sub Total		51
RDP Programme		
RDP Head Office	Peshawar	15
RDP Cross Border	Khushi	9
RDP // //	Malistan	21
RDP // //	Jaghori	11
Sub Total		56
PHC Project		
Head Office	Mardan	10
BHU Baghicha	Baghicha Camp	24
BHU Gandaf	Gandaf Camp	23
Children Park	Gandaf Camp	5
BHU Kagan	Kagan Camp	15
Training Team	Mardan	8
BHU Behsud	Behsud Jalalabad	12
BHU Khushi	Logar Khushi	13
BHU Malistan	Ghazni Malistan	9
Sub Total		119
SBH Cross Border	Logar	6
Sub Total		6
Total Staff		<u>255</u>

STAFF IN PESHAWAR:

Central Services

Director
 Main Office Coordinator
 Secretary
 Computer Operator
 Telephone/Fax Operator
 Driver (2)
 Cook
 Chowkidar (7)
 Chief Accountant
 Accountant
 Accountant Helper

Total 18 Staff

RDP Head Office

Programme Manager/Coordinator
 Administrator
 Computer Operator
 Agricultural Manager
 Chief Engineer
 Veterinary Manager
 Field Monitor
 Storekeeper
 Driver

Total 9 Staff

RDP PROJECT SITES

Ghazni Liaison Office:

Administrator
 Chowkidar

Total 2 Staff

Jaghori:

Team Leader
 Agricultural Senior Field Officer
 Site Engineer
 Paravet
 Storekeeper
 Chowkidar

Total 6 Staff

ARC Staff List, for the year 1990.

<u>Project</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Total Staff Number</u>
Main Office/Train.Dept.	Peshawar	23
<hr/>		
Sub Total		23
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TTC Canal Road	Canal Road	19
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<hr/>		
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RDP Programme		
RDP Head Office	Peshawar	15
RDP Cross Border	Khushi	9
RDP // //	Malistan	21
RDP // //	Jaghori	11
<hr/>		
Sub Total		56
PHC Project		
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BHU Baghicha	Baghicha Camp	24
BHU Gandaf	Gandaf Camp	23
Children Park	Gandaf Camp	5
BHU Kagan	Kagan Camp	15
Training Team	Mardan	8
BHU Behsud	Behsud Jalalabad	12
BHU Khushi	Logar Khushi	13
BHU Malistan	Ghazni Malistan	9
<hr/>		
Sub Total		119
SBH Cross Border	Logar	6
<hr/>		
Sub Total		6
<hr/>		
Total Staff		<u>255</u>

Malistan:
 Team Leader
 Agricultural Field Officer
 Nursery Helper
 Site Engineer
 Storekeeper
 Chowkidar
 Animal Husbandry Officer
 Shepherd
 Helper
 Paravet
 BHU Doctor
 BHU Chowkidar

Total 12 Staff

Khushi:
 Team Leader
 Agricultural Field Officer
 Site Engineer
 Chowkidar
 Storekeeper
 BHU Chowkidar

Total 6 Staff

Total in Project Sites 26

All RDP Project sites are in Afghanistan.

SANITATION AND BASIC HEALTH PROGRAMME:

SBH Manager - Main Office Peshawar
 2 Senior Field Officers - Project Site
 Field Officer - Project Site
 Administrator - Main Office Peshawar

Total 5 Staff (2 - Main Office Peshawar)
 (3 - Project Site)

TOTAL NUMBER OF STAFF (27.01.1994) 58

Present Situation at:

i) Peshawar HQ's 29 Staff
 ii) Project Sites/ 29 Staff

ARC. DECEMBER 1993

ARC AS WHOLE:

- (a) Total staff: 255
 Afghans 248, Pakistani 12, Expatriates 5

PROJECTS:

1. CENTRAL SERVICES:

- (a) Total staff: 20
 Afghans 16, Pakistani 2, Expatriates 2

- (b) Total Budget: Rs. 3,172,530

Activities:

- i. Providing guidance and support in decision making.
- ii. Monitoring and evaluation of ARC staff and projects.
- iii. Providing administrative support services and facilities to the projects.

2. TRAINING DEPARTMENT:

- (a) Total staff: 3
 Afghan 2, Expatriate 1

- (b) Total Budget: Rs. 1,632,000
 (Approx)

- (c) Objective: Provide training for all ARC staff members who have access to training.

- (d) Achievement: 85 staff members of ARC trained in different skills and English language.

Activities:

Conducting needs assessments, organizing monitoring and evaluation, in-house local and overseas courses, offering management advice and support, and resource development.

This programme was not continued into 1994.

3. TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTERS (TTC):

Refugee Programme based in Canal Road and Akora Khattak, Pakistan.

- (a) Total staff: 51 (All Afghans)
- (b) Total Budget: Rs. 8,602,000
- (c) Objectives: 280 Afghans to be trained in 1993. Practical and theoretical training provided.
- (d) Achievement: 237 trainees graduated from both TTCs in 1993.

Activities:

Training in vocational skills of electrical and radio repair, tinsmithery and welding, blacksmithery, carpentry, masonry. To undertake follow up of trainees after graduation. Literacy and Islamiat classes included in the training.

In 1994 TTC Canal Road will maintain its training courses for three months. Akora Khattak will close.

TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTRE (TTC):

Cross border activities based in Malistan, Ghazni Province.

- (a) Staff: 9 (All Afghans)
- (b) Budget: Rs. 1,365,000
- (c) Objective: 60 trainees to be trained in Malistan in 1994.
- (d) Achievement: 50 trainees graduated from the Malistan TTC in 1994.

Activities:

Training conducted in the following skills: Electrical wiring and radio repair, tinsmithery and welding, blacksmithery, masonry, and carpentry. To undertake follow up of trainees after graduation. Literacy and Islamiat classes to be included in the training.

This project was not continued into 1994.

4 RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (RDP)
CROSS-BORDER:

- (a) Total staff: 54
Afghans 53, Expatriate 1
- (b) Total Budget: Rs. 7,277,000
- (c) Beneficiaries: Direct and indirect beneficiaries will be the local population of the project areas.

Activities:

RDP has projects in the following areas:

Malistan and Jaghori (Ghazni Province)

Khushi (Logar Province)

Charkh/Baraki Barak

The following projects have been implemented in some or all of these areas:

crop production, fruit tree nurseries, plant protection, rehabilitation of irrigated networks, veterinary services, and income generation projects.

This programme was not continued into 1994.

5 PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (PHC):
In Pakistan:

- (a) Total staff: 85
Afghans 75, Pakistani 10
- (b) Total Budget: Rs. 7,201,000
- (c) Beneficiaries: More than 32,000 refugees in camps at Baghicha, Gandaf and Kaghan.
Approx. 4 trained health worker per year.

Activities:

The Programme has 3 BHUs (Gandaf, Baghicha, Kaghan) a Training Unit, and the Mardan Office in the Mardan district. Preventive, curative, promotive, and rehabilitation health care. Training and education to health workers.

This programme is on going.

PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (PHC):

Cross Border

- (a) Total staff: 34 (All Afghans). Figure includes Jalalabad, Khushi and Malistan BHUs).
- (b) Total Budget: Rs. 1,865,500
- (c) Beneficiaries: People of Khushi district 10,000
Displaced people from Kabul and people of Behsud in Jalalabad around 20,000.
People of Malistan around 100,000.

Activities:

- Treatment of common diseases
- Provision of essential drugs
- Malaria Control Programme
- Provision of a full range of health services.
- Maternal and Child Health services.
- Dental Care Programme.

This programme was not continued into 1994.

6 SANITATION AND BASIC HEALTH PROGRAMME (SBH)
CROSS-BORDER, AFGHANISTAN:

- (a) Total staff 6 (All Afghans)
- (b) Total Budget: Rs. 1,813,550
- (c) Objectives: To reduce the incidence of water and sanitation related diseases.
To improve the quality of life, especially for women
To promote self help and community development.

- (d) Achievement:
Construction of 230 effective low cost latrines. Improvement of 15 shallow wells. Provision of basic health education for the majority of the villagers (approx. 10,000 people).

Activities:

Areas of involvement are Khushi/Kolangar, Baraki Rajan. 2 teams in Logar. Activities include construction of latrines, improvement of dug wells and health education.

This programme was completed.

The programme was not continued into 1994.

7 WOMEN'S PROGRAMME:

a Total staff: 2

Afghans 1, Expatriate 1

b Total Budget: Rs. 795,775

c Objective:

Introduce activities to local women of the community of Malistan, Ghazni, the products to used for income generation.

d Achievement:


68 women in the Malistan area were involved in various activities in the income generation project.

e Activities:

Production of Kilims, pilot production of namads, knitted garments, spunwool and soap. Feasibility studies of kitchen gardens, poultry and beekeeping were undertaken.

This programme was not continued into 1994.

ARC budget for 1980 - 1993



— Million Rupees

Financial Aspect:
Budget for 1991 - 1993

DONATIONS:	<u>1993</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1991</u>
ADC	16,313,100	12,901,856	14,719,388
Others	13,007,708	20,222,590	19,534,599
TOTAL ARC	29,320,808	33,124,446	34,253,987

<u>BUDGET</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1991</u>
<u>Training</u>			
Budget	1,795,200	1,980,000	2,980,010
Expenses	699,200	953,000	2,366,600

Technical Training Centers (TTC's):

Budget	8,602,000	8,426,000	6,446,000
Expenses	7,968,500	5,763,800	5,666,200

Primary Health Care (PHC)

Budget	9,081,380	8,602,000	7,436,000
Expenses	8,312,800	6,600,100	6,450,900

TOTAL ADC:

Budget	19,478,580	19,008,000	16,862,010
Expenses	16,980,500	13,316,900	14,483,700

CROSS-BORDER PROGRAMME

	<u>1993</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1991</u>
Budget	15,879,328	17,398,786	15,853,999
Expenses	15,259,609	15,490,037	19,109,970

ADC + CROSS BORDER:


Budget	35,357,908	36,406,786	32,716,009
Donations	29,320,808	33,124,446	34,253,987
Expenses	32,240,109	28,806,937	33,593,670

OVER\

<u>UNDERSPENT</u>	-2,919,301	+4,317,509	+ 660,317
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ARC Budget

From 1991 to 1993



List of ARC Property

I. Vehicles :

Type of Vehicle	Regist. No.	Location	Purchasing Price
1- Daihatsu Jeep	PRF 5869 Mod.1982	M.O	80,000
2- Toyota Hilux	PRK 1989 Mod.1986	M.O	220,000
3- Toyota Corolla Station Wagon	PRK 1962 Mod.1986	M.O	200,000
4- Toyota Corolla Station Wagon	PRM 9243 Mod.1989	M.O	350,000
5- Toyota Land Cruiser	PRP 2335 Mod.1990	M.O	250,000
6- Toyota Haice	PRP 5874 Mod.1993	M.O	376,000
7- Toyota Pickup	PRK 6689 Mod.1985	RDP	193,000
8- Toyota Land Cruiser	X68 Af 4 Mod.1984	RDP	200,000
9- Toyota Hilux Pickup	PRO 6983 Mod.1986	RDP	160,000
10- 2 Russian Jeeps		RDP	30,000
11- Toyota Haice	PRK 2098 Mod.1986	TTC	250,000
12- Toyota Haice	PRK 1932 Mod.1986	TTC	250,000
13- Toyota Haice	PRO 1872 Mod.	TTC	312,300
14- Toyota Station Wagon	PRO 7023 Mod.1987	TTC	230,000
15- Toyota Hilux Pickup	PRK 6442 Mod.1987	PHC	} Total 1,470,000
16- Toyota Corolla	PRM 9213 1989	PHC	
17- Toyota Land Cruiser	PRK 6683 Mod.1986	PHC	
18- Toyota Land Cruiser	PRK 6684 Mod.1986	PHC	
19- Toyota Haice	PRK 6443 Mod.1987	PHC	
20- Toyota Station Wagon	PRO 6994 Mod.	PHC	

Total

II Air Conditioners:

<u>Type</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Purchasing Price</u>
Japanese	11 sets	M.O	110,000
Russian	10 sets	M.O	60,000

III Computers:

Japanese Old Model	7 sets	M.O	140,000
Taiwanese new model	3 sets	M.O	79,000
Lab Tap	1 sets	M.O	65,000
UPS	7	M.O	70,000

IV Machines:

Photocopier	2 sets	M.O	200,000
Fax machine	1	M.O	45,000
Other Inventories:		M.O	382392

Sub Total 1,151,392

PHC Programme:

Computers:	2 sets	Mardan Office	130,000
Air Conditioners	3	// //	25,000
Other Inventories		HQ+BHUs	1,337,968

Sub Total 1,492,968

TTC Programme:

All Inventories:	TTCs	183828
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Sub Total 183828

RDP Programme:

Motor Bikes	7 MB	Malistan	225,000
Motor Bikes	5 MB	Jaghori	182,000
Motor Bikes	2 MB	Logar	60,000
Tractor	1	Logar	120,000
Trasher	.1	Logar	15,000

Sub total 602,000

Other inventories	RDP Projects	503,781
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Grand total 8,505,269

RDP Objectives and Achievements in 1993

AGRICULTURE

Agricultural Section in Malistan in 1993

	% Completion Dec.1993
1 - Seed Trail and Multiplication	100%
2 - Fruit Tree Nurseries	60%
3 - Vegetable	50%
4 - Plant Protection (LEISA Method)	Unsuccessful

Agricultural Section in Jaghori in 1993

1 - Seed Trail and Multiplication	100%
2 - Fruit Tree Nurseries	70%
3 - Vegetable	70%
4 - Plant Protection (LEISA Method)	Unsuccessful

Agricultural Section in Khushi in 1993

1 - Seed Trail and Multiplication	100%
2 - Fruit Tree Nurseries	50%
3 - Vegetable	80%
4 - Plant Protection (LEISA Method)	Unsuccessful

Engineering Programme

Irrigation in Malistan in 1993

Planned Activities in 1993

- 1 - Construction of Korsang Bridge.
- 2 - Improving Jui-e-Deba.
- 3 - Construction of 6 mini-bridges.
- 4 - Construction of storage.
- 5 - Construction of water reservoir.
- 6 - Farm leveling.

Achievement of Planned Activities in 1993

	<u>Completion</u>
1 - Building Korsang Bridge	40%
2 - Improving of Jui-e-Deba	70%
3 - Construction of 6 minibridges:	
4 Minibridges Completed	66.6%
4 - Construction of storage	100%
5 - Construction of water reservoir	70%
6 - Farm leveling	10%

Irrigation in Jaghori 1993

Achievement of Planned Activities 1993

1 - Construction of Aqueduct of Awbkho:	100 %
2 - Construction of Intake Jui-e-Nau:	100 %
3 - Bridge of Awburda over Jaghori river:	96 %
4 - Takalghu foot bridge:	100 %
5 - Subsang Gabion construction:	85 %
6 - Solar Energy oven:	80 %
7 - Distribution of Equipment for cleaning 20 Kar.	100 %
8 - Widening of Jui-e-Nau:	70 %

Irrigation in Khushi District of Logar Province 1993

Achievement of Planned Activities 1993

1 - Aqueduct of Deh Balah:	100 % Completed
2 - Construction of 4 Minibridges:	Not implemented
3 - 7 Irrigation outlets:	14.2 % - one completed
4 - Intake Dakah:	Uncompleted
5 - 3 Gabions construction:	100 % completed
6 - Retaining wall Rahi-Bala;	100 %
7 - Dubayak retaining wall - request from community - unplanned	100 %
8 - Construction of water distributors planned	100 %
9 - Construction of 3 gabion - unplanned	100 %

Note: Communities often request unplanned activities in preference to planned activities, which is more logical and reasonable.

Female Unit and Income Generation Section in Malistan

Planned Activities in 1993

- 1 - Kilim weaving project
- 2 - Wool spinning project
- 3 - Namat making project
- 4 - Sock and glove project
- 5 - Soap making project
- 6 - Beekeeping project

Achievement of Planned Activities in 1993


- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| 1 - Kilim weaving project | partially successful. Hindered by lack of raw materials and marketing. |
| 2 - Wool Spinning project | partially successful due to the lack of raw materials and marketing |
| 3 - Namat making project | not successful |
| 4 - Sock and glove project | partially successful |
| 5 - Soap making project | not successful - raw materials had to be transported from Pakistan to Malistan which was very expensive. |
| 6 - Beekeeping project | not successful |

RDP Survey Team

The team, according to the planned activities, conducted base-line survey at the village level in Malistan and Jaghori districts during June, July and August 1993. Khushi district had been studied earlier in May. The status of the cumulative resources of the community such as human, livestock, land, water, forest, pasture, wildlife, health and education resources were the main programme for survey team.

The achievement of planned activities: 100 % completed.

Further more, 5 village organizations were established in the Malistan district in July. Due to the lack of RDP contribution in terms of capital and problems of banking, the activities of village organization were delayed for the year of 1993. It should be followed in 1994, or there may be negative repercussions on the rural development programme in Malistan.



MAP OF AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

- International boundary
- - - Provincial boundary
- - - - - Divisional boundary
- ▭ District boundary
- ◻ Centrally administered areas
- ◻ National capital
- Provincial capital
- ⊙ Divisional capital
- ⊙ District/Tribal area capital

The state of Jammu and Kashmir is in dispute. Its accession to India or Pakistan has not been decided through plebiscite under the United Nations

